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In 
The Supreme C9ourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
IN THE ni..:-\_TTER OF THE 
ESTATE O.r' CHARLES WE'S-
LEY "\~VATERS, Deceased, 
1!=< .. _ E ± & 





Appeal From the Third District Court of Utah, 
for Salt Lake County . 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This is a proceeding begun by appellant against 
respondent, by a petition under Utah Rev. St. 1933, 
102-6-1, to remove the latter, cancel her letters, and 
be substituted as administratrix of said estate. Re~ 
spondent demurred. Son1e amendatory paragraphs 
were then filed.. Thereafter the petition as 
amended and demurrer were submitted for decision 
upon briefs filed by the parties. The court sus-
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tained the demurrer. Appellant refused to further 
amend, electing to stand upon her petition as 
amended. The court then entered jud.gment dis· 
missing the petition and petitioner appeals. 
The petition alleges in substance that the re-
spondent wrongfully and surreptitiously caused 
and procured letters to be jssued to herself by 
means of false and misleading statements in and 
omissions from her petition, and that as a cons e. 
quence statutory notice of the hearing was not 
given to app,ellant. 
The pertinent sections of Utah Rev. Stat. 1933 are: 
102-4-1. Administration of the estate of a 
pe!son dying intestate must be granted to 
some one or more of the persons herein-
after mentioned, the relatives of the de-
ceased being entitled to administer only 
'vhen they are entitled to succeed to his 
p~ersonal estate', or some portion thereof; 
and they are respectively entitled in the 
follo,ving order: (1) the surviving hus-
band or 'vife; (2) the children; (3) the 
father or mother, . . . etc. 
102-4-7. Petitions for letters of adminis-
tration must he in writing, signed by the 
applicant or his attorney} and filed with 
the clerk of the court, stating the facts 
essential to rrive the court jurisdiction of 
the mattflr; and when known to the appli-
cant, he must Alate the names, ages and 
residence of the heirs of the decedent, and 
the value and character of the property. 
102-4-8. When a petition for letters of· ad-
ministration is filed, the court or clerk 
must set the petition for hearing and give 
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notice thereof by publication, or by posting 
and by mailing notices to the heirs. 
102-4-9. Any person interested may con-
test the p1etition by filing an answ·er thereto 
on the ground of the incompetency of the 
applicant, or may assert his own rights to the 
administration and p,ray that ietters be 
issued to himself. 
102-6-1. The court may at any time sus-
pend any administrator, executor or 
guardian; and may, upo~ citation, revoke 
the letters of any administrator upon the 
petition of a competent p1erson having a 
prior right thereto who had no qpportun-
ity to apply. . . . 
Thus, the District Court is required, upon notice 
and a hearing, to determine who are the heirs at 
law and widow of a decedent (1) upon the p·etition 
of a claimant of letters whose petition states the 
names, ages and residence of the heirs; and (2) 
upon the filing of a petition under Section 102-6-1 
by ''a competent person having a prior right 
thereto.'' 
The opposing claims of the parties arise from their 
1narriage to t4e same man. Appellant and Mr 
Waters were married at Valparaiso, Ind., on July 
29, 1935. R.espondent n1arried him , on September 
16, 1938 while appellant was alive and in health. 
She relies upon an alleged divorce from app;ellant 
to validate her junior marriage. App~ellant re-
joins that the div-orce was void for lack of juris-
diction of the subject matter and parties under the 
admitted facts. A brief outline of the -p·a.rties and 
their rel~.tions and doings 'viii be useful, in limine. 
Charles Wesley Waters was a thrice married man. 
His first 'vife 'vas divorced from him in 1933 after 
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the birth of their daughter Dolores, now with h1s 
relatives in Burlington, Iowa. His acquaintance 
with respondent Silvia began either before or ver)' 
shortly after that divorce, for their son Daniel was 
born in 1~34 and was f1ve years old in 1939 as her 
petition for letters states. They did not marry un-
til 19·38. Meantime he had 1net, wooed and mar-
ried appellant, lVIiss Lena Shanko in- 19:15, and re-
sided with her in Chicago for over two years. Then 
he abandoned her in the latter part of 1937, andre ... 
joined Silvia, and the two took up, their residence in 
Salt Lake City. Soon afterward, in N ovemher, 
1937, he commenced an action for divorce against 
app.ellant in the District Court for Salt Lake 
County. As both women were thereafter known as 
Mrs. Waters, we will, with their permission and to 
better disting11ish them, refer to them by their first 
names. 
In his complaint for divorce Mr. Waters alleged 
that he had been an actual and bona fide resident 
of the State of Utah for more than one year next 
orior thereto. This statement was false and fraud· 
~lent becauBe he well knew that he had deserted 
app.ellant in Chicago only a short time before. 
Under 
Utah Rev. St. 1933, 40-3-1, 
and similar ~tatutes in nearly all the states, statu-
tory residence is jurisdictional and must be strictly 
alleged and proved. If untruthfully alleged it de-
feats jurisdiction and voids the decree. Neither 
the subject matter nor th(:\ parties are before the 
court. If the court, deceived and misled by the 
plaintiff, finds the fact of residence, or recites it 
in its decree, yet the contrary can al\vays he sho·wn 
by the defendant, or by any other person against 
'vhom the deere~ is offered, in any court, action or 
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defense, whether by parties, pr1v1es or stra.ng·ers. 
It is simply no judgment, no record, and may be 
contradicted anywhere by any one on jurisdictional 
grounds. Jurisdiction cannot even be acquired or 
conferred by consent, by joining issu~, by assuming 
to exercise it, or by a finding that the. court has it. 
O'Dell v. Goff, (Mich.), 117 N. \V. 59, 61. 
Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496; 7 4 N. E. 443. 
Neff v. Beauchamp, 74 Iowa 9~. 
Cheeley Y. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701. 
Parish v. Parish, 32 Ga. 653. 
Holmes v. Holmes, 63 Me. 420. 
Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590. 
Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156, 161. 
Croucl!_ v. Crouch, 30 Wis. 667. 
15 Am. Jur., P. 277-8· and ca.ses. 
.. 
I 
The decisions are very numerous. Exhaustive 
citation would defeat its purpose. Cumulative cita-
tions will however be found in classified arrange-
ment on later pages of this brief (post pp. go-91:,.. 19- 2. '2-
Many of the cases contain a discussion of the full 
faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, 
a point not pertinent here. That was because the 
divorce plaintiff left his wife and went to another 
State and sued for divorce by p:ublication without 
acquiring statutory residence there. The decree 
was always rejected r;1 jurisdictional grounds. The 
full faith and credit clause was invoked to sustain 
it, but without avail. It is well settled that the full 
faith and credit clause accords to foreign judg-
ments only the weight and credit to which it is en-
titled in the State where it was rendered. If void 
there it is void everywhere else, and usually vice 
versa. That is, the judgment becomes p;ractically 
a domestic judgment in every State, everywhere. 
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McDonald v. Mabee 243 U. S. 90; 37 Sup. 
Court 343. 
Haddoek v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562; 26 Sup. 
Court 535-6 citing 
Harding v. Harding, 198 tT. S. 317; 25 Sup. 
Court 679; 48 L. Ed. 1026. 
Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 N. Y. 253; Syl. 3. 
At bar, the divorce judgment and the proceeding in 
which it is relied on are both domestic, hence the 
full faith and credit clause has no bearing. But • 
the jurisdiction~!~ of the cited cases ·~A 
fl'posite. _ ~ ' 
In this case, the facts as to Mr. Waters' residence 
in Illinois, not in Utah, during the year next before 
his divorce action are alleged in Lena's petition to 
remove Silvia, and are admitted by Silvia's de-
murrer. In like manner it is alle.ged and admitted 
that at all times during the divorce action, and at 
the time the affidavit for an order for publication 
of summons \\Tas made a:od filed, J\fr. \Vaters well 
knew that the exact residence street address of his 
wife was No. 7516 Cornell Avenue in Chicago, Ill. 
Hence it was his duty to put that information on 
the records of the court so that she might receive 
notice of the action and app~ear and defend the 
same. Instead he concealed it. He sought publica-
tion to satisfy app·earances while contriving to de-
feat the purpose thereof. With the knowledge he 
had he should have filed any affidavit the occasion 
called for. InsteRd hr- caused his attorney to file 
an affidavit that he had searched and inquired for 
the defendant Lena in Utah, could not find her 
therein, and that from his best knowledge and in-
formation she resides "in Chicago, Ill." - a city 
of millions of people. There "ras no reasonable 
ground for supposing that an envelope mailed by 
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the clerk to that address would ever be received by 
the defendant Lena. a.s in fact it was not. 
This procedure was adjudged by this court to be 
utterly insufficient to confer jurisdiction and the 
judgment pased thereon was rejected as void, ID 
Liebhart v. Lawrence, 40 U'tah 243; 1~0 
Pac. 215. 
It was ruled that the intent of the statute requires 
a showing of facts from which the court or clerk 
would be justified in concluding that due diligence 
had been exercised to ascertain defendant's cor-
rect address where the summons would be received 
when mailed, by inquiry from persons and sources 
most likely to result in knowledge thereof. The 
affidavit .must disclose the stepis taken, from whom 
inquiry was made, how followed up, etc., so that the 
court or clerk may judge whether due diligence has 
been exercised, rather than that the affiant him ... 
self decide that matter by a recital of diligence in 
his affidavit. That a "bald statement" of diligent 
search and inquiry in the affidavit in the words of 
the statute is a bare conclusion .and insufficient. 
The affidavit in this case was deceptive and mis-
leading. i:1 stating merely that search and inquiry 
had been made in Utah for the defendant Lena 
without stating~ any facts justifying a sea,rch for 
her in this State. ~1\lso in stating merely that the 
affiant believes she resides ''in Chicago, Ill.,'' 
without any showing of facts justifying an infer .. 
ence that her street adaress there, of No. 7516 Cor-
nell Ave. was unknown to plaintiff or his attorney, 
or that it could not. be ascertained by diligent in-
(]niry, setting out the facts constituting such in-
quiry. Clearly, both plaintiff and his attorney de-
sired a p.ro forma publication only, and one that 
would not come to the defendant's knowledge or 
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attention, lest she might appear and defend. And it 
resulted as desired. 'I'he wife received no notice of 
the action and she knew nothing of it until in June, 
1940. 
Where false, misleading or deceptive statements 
are m~de in an affidavit f~r an order for publica-
tion of summons in an action, or where a false re-
turn of service is made by an officer caused or pro-
cured by the plaintiff, or wher~y any other contriv-
anciJ the defendant is deprived of her chance to 
appear and defend, the result will be that no juris-
diction is acquired and the resulting judgment is 
void. 
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 43 lTtah 253; 134 
Pac. 595. 
Cavanaugh v. Smith, 84 Ind. 380. 
Holmes v. Holmes, 63 Me. 420. 
Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590. 
It is further alleged in Lena's petition, and ad-
mitted by the demurrer, that no summons was in 
fact ever issued in the divorce actions of Waters 
v. Waters. 
Section 104-5-2, R. S. 1933, 
requires the issuance of a summons in statutory 
form signed by the plaintiff or his ,attorney. If no 
such summons \Va~ ever issued, how could it be 
served in any event. And Section 104-5-11 requires 
service of summons, when one has been issued, by 
delivering a copy thereof to the defendant if per-
sonally served, or by publication thereof if served 
that wa.y (104-5-12). Where no original summons 
exists there cannot possibly be a copry thereof, hence 
no service by delivery or publication of what does 
not and cannot exist. 
Further, it is alleged and admitted that the com-
plaint, affidavit for publication and order for pub· 
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lication of a theoretical but non-existent summons 
\vere all filed in the clerk's office at the same time 
on November 2.4, 1937, 'Yithout any sho\Ying of dil-
igent but fruitless effort to serve a summons. If 
there had been an actual sumn1ons issued, there was 
no sho,ving of due diligence ( 104-5-12) to serve it, 
and none could have been sho,vn in so short an ill-
terim, or no interim, bet,veen the substantially in-
stantaneous filings. In such cas.e the ensuing judg-
rnents 'yere held void in 
Clayton v. Clayton, 4 Colo. 410. 
Israel Y. Arthur, 7 Colo. 5. 
Other jurisdictional defects are alleged and ad-
mitted by demurrer, which we p:ass by for the 
present. 
It is further alleged and admitted that the defend-
ant in the divorce action, app·ellant here, had no 
knowledge, notice or information of the action, nor 
of Silvia's application for letters up.on the estate 
until during a chance visit to Salt Lake City, Utah 
in June, 1940, whereupon she at once employed 
counsel and filed her petition to oust Silvia. Also 
admitted by demurrer that Silvia had full knowl-
edge of all the 1na tters of fact alleged as invalidat-
ing the divorce decree, at the- time thereof, and that 
she conniYed and rolluded ,,r]th Mr. Vl aters in his 
~teps and proceedings for divorce: that she well 
k.,_,~,,,. Mr. ''rater~ "\YR~ not thereby. divorced from 
appellant; that she could not lawfully marry him 
when she dirl: that ~he did not beeome his wife 
therebv and wa.s not his widow when he died in 
AuguRt, 1939, and that sb~ has no right to letters 
nnon his estate and no right to inherit as widow. 
That in her petition for such letters she falsely and 
fraudulentlv claimed to be his widow, knowing that 
she was not therebv deceiving the clerk and court 
' . 
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as to who was entitled to notice of the hearing, and 
who might be interested in contesting the p~tition. 
As a consequence, the record shows (Ab. pp. 3-20) 
that notices of the hearing were mailed only to the 
persons named. in Silvia's petition, viz: to Silvia 
herself, and to the two young children, Dolores and 
Daniel, and not to the true wife at her residence 
street address in 'Chicago, which was "\Vell known 
to Silvia. Result: appellant obtained no notice of 
the hearing, did not appear, and letters to Silvia 
were granted without appellant's kno·wledge. Also 
alleged and admitted that Silvia well knew appel· 
]ant was the wife and widow of the deceased, and 
that had notice been given her she would have 
appeared and contested the petition. That she has 
taken possession of the assets, filed an incomplete 
inventory, is appropriating the assets to her own 
use; is insolvent, bas given bond \vith inadequate 
,surety, and cannot respond in damages. 
POINTS 
1Jnder the admitted facts Silvia has no legal kin-
ship to the deceased and no qualifying interest in 
his estate as required by the Statute 102-4.-1 to en-
title her to administer. In the recent case of 
In re Clovva.rd 's (Searle's) ·Estate, 95 
Utah 453, 
this Court held that such qualifying interest and 
kinship are jurisdictional requireme;nts and that 
letters issued in violation thereof are void, Justices 
Wolfe and Folland dissented on that point. But all 
agree that the statute should be enforced as a mat-
ter of obeying the law in a matter within the com· 
petency of the legislature to enact. The adminis-
tration of the estate is still pending. Hence 've did 
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not have to "~ait and test jurisdiction after the es-
tate is closed. Section 104-6-1 p~rovides the re1nedy 
at hand. Hence SilYia is not entrenched in the 
fruits of her w·rong· doing. She can no 1nore acquire 
a status as wife, \Yido\Y and heir, an interest in the 
estate, or a right to administer it, by swearing in 
her petition that she has them, than could Mr. 
Waters acquire a resl.dence in Utah by swearing in 
his divorce complaint that he had it. Neither could 
either of them deprive this appellant of her rights 
by misst~;.ting the facts and by depriving her of 
statutory notice of their proceedin.gs. 
A case on its facts much like the present was that in 
Weyant v. lJtah Savings & Trust Co., 54 
Utah 181; 182 Pac. 189, 
in which a husband abandoned his family in the 
east, eloped with a young girl to Utah where they 
lived for some years under an assumed name. He 
acquired property and died. The girl, then a 
mature woman, took out letters, wound up, and 
cloRed the estate, taking distribution to -herself. 
Thereafter the true \\"ife and \vidow learned tlie 
fact~~ came to Utah, sued the ''strange woman'' and 
the surety on her hond, and recovered the value of 
the dissipated estate. The "assumed name'' in 
that-case was but an additional means of conceal-
rnent from the 'vife and of cheating her of her rights 
in the eQta.te. But it \vas not the only means em-
p] oyed, nor was the relief given based on that -alone. 
The falsification of facts as to heirship a.nd wido\v·-
hood in the petition fr-r letters, the prevention 
thereby of notice to the wife and heirs, are common 
to that case and this one. We shall have occasion 
to cite this Weyant case again at a later place in 
this brief in answer to the suggestion that we should 
have sued in equity rather ·than follow our stat-
utory remedy under 102-6-1. -v..r e shall now take up 
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the grounds of Silvia's demurrer to appellant's 
petition for.her removal. 
1. 
The first ground of demurrer was that our petition 
does not state sufficient facts. We say that no ~~ 
further fact~ are required under Section 102-6-1 !loJ 
that\ such as will show that appellant Lena is "a ~~ 
competent p·erson'' to receive letters, and that she , ~ 
has ''a prior right'' thereto, and had ''no previous W) 
opportunity to apply.'' This she showed by alleg- ~w 
ing that she married Mr. Waters in 1935, and that ~~ ill1 
Silvia married him in 1938 during apellant 's life- I ill 
\ time. T4is. ~as enough to state a cau~e o~ action·.' . .l.J •j ~ 
and put SilVIa upon her defense. Likewise her....,~ 
: artifice and deceit in omitting from her petitio~ ;: 
appellant's name as wife and wido,v and suhstitut-
, ing her own name, and so causing that appellant 
Rhould not receive a copy of the notice of hearing 
I which the clerk mailed to each of the heirs named 
·,\in the petition. Section 102-4-7 requires that a peti-
tion for letters must state the names, ages and res-
idences of the heirs, when kno'wn, hench. must truth .. 
I 
fully state them. A petition for letters is an ad-
jversary proceeding, and the true widow and heirs 
i are a.dverse partie~ in interest and necessary par-
. ties defendant, hence must be :ioined as defendants 
by naming th0m. in the p~etition~ so that they 
may receive- at least statutory notice by post-
ing or publica.ti nn and mailing of the notice 
of hearing ,vhicl1 Rt.ands in the rPlation of· 
process or srnnmons to the l)etition. If 
. : omitted7 they can not be said to be hound. While 
. the p.roceecijn_g is in rem, yet all interested claim-
. ants are entitled to such notice as the statute pre-
~crihes for their protection. Otherwise, they are 
deprived nf th0ir rir.~ht ilnoer J 02-4-9 as an "inter-
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ested person'' to come in and ·'contest the p~eti ... 
tion by filing· an answer thereto on the groun4 of 
incompetency of the applicant" and to "assert 
their o"rn rights to the adminh:;tration and pray 
that letters be issued to himself.'' 
The result of Silvia's suppressing appellant's name 
from her petition for letters and thereby causing 
that no notice shoud be given her of the proceed-
ing is no different from wha.t the result would be in 
any other action or proceeding. r~ehus, where a 
plaintiff claiming a tract of land sues to quiet his 
alleg·ed title thereto·, and in his complaint omits the 
known owper of the legal title, or any other claim-
ant of an interest therein, from his complaint, and 
causes no summons to issue or be served naming 
such owner or advel·se claimant, the decree that he 
may obtain will bind only those actually named in 
his compalint as defendants adversely claiming. No 
one else. In like manner, the object of a petition 
for letters of administration, is to get possession of 
the decedent's estate and shut out all adverse 
claimants and creditors, and take distribution. it 
wHI not work as against those entitled to be joined 
as defendants, entitled to notice, and who hy their 
omission frcm the petition 9-o not get notice of the 
hearing. Hence the above facts in appellant's peti-
tion showPd her interest, her right to administer, 
her lack of notice of Silvia 'R petition~ and hence 
th::tt she l1ad no prD'\rious opp.ort.unity to file an an-
s"rer to Silvj.g, 's jJ-eti tj on, contest the same, and ~how 
her o"rn rigl1t as allowed by 102-4-9. Silvia 'vus 
bound to ans"rer and sho"' cause why her letters be 
Pnt ·caneelled. 
If, in answering, she wished to confess and avoid 
Lena's petition by alleging and proving- a vaHd 
divorce of the latter from !fr. Waters, justifying 
hPr later marrin~~:c to him; that ,x,rould be an affirn1-
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ative defense for Silvia. And in reply, Lena could 
object to the introduction of the supposed aivorce 
decree by showing that it was voi(l on jurisdic-
tional grounds; as our citations show. 1'his is per-
haps the uBual order of pirocedure, but it is not the 
only way. 
Appellant desired and chose to get the whole matter 
up for decision upon her petition, if demurred to, 
and so avoid the delay and expense of a trial uf ·the 
facts, with witnesses from afar and depositions. 
And so she anticipated the only defense Silvia hud, 
by alleging in her p·etition that Silvia claims, in 
justification of her junior marriage to 1\fr. "\Vaters, 
that the latter had been divorced from Lena on 
February 18, 1938 in ease No. 602H9 in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County, hut that such pro-
ceeding and decree was void for lack of jurisdiction 
of the court over the subject matter and parties, 
specifying the facts which xnaJe it void. Silvia did 
not object to this anticipation of her defen~e, but 
admitted it by joining issue b~r rlemurrt~r. This waR 
a. logical and legitin1ate course~ saving expense to 
both parties in getting the case up for decision upo!l 
what was in effect an agreed statement of facts by 
petition and demurrer. Thus the issues are pre-
ciselv the same a.s if the same facts had been pre-
sent~d by petition, ans\ver and reply. But the peti-
tion is not deficient in facts because it ~tates all the 
matters underlyinp: the clai.J;ns of both parties in 
one pleading. 
2. 
The second ground of demurrer was that the Dis-
trict Court does not have jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of appellant's petition to re1nove Silvia 
and revoke her letters. We just do not ''get'' t.hi~ 
contention, in view of Section 102-6-1 expressly con-
feting jurisdiction thereof, and in view of the re· 
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peated decisions of this Court that jurisdiction of 
subject matter refers to the Court's power and 
authority by law to try and deter1nine the class of 
cases to which the one in question belon.gs. 
Snyder v. Pike, 30 Utah 10:2; 83 Pac. 692. 
Sanipoli v. Coal Co., 31 Utah 114; 86 Pac. 
865. 
!Cramer v. Pixton, 72 Utah 1; 268 Pac. 1029. 
But we are apprised by the demurrer itself that it 
does not really mean what it says in this respect, 
because it specifies as -reasons for the supposed 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction that: 
A. The matters alleged in the petition are 
a collateral attack on the default divorce 
obtained by the deceased Charles Wesley 
Waters. 
B. The petitioner does not p.ray that the 
default divorce proceedings of Charles 
Wesley Waters be set aside, - etc. 
These ''reasons'' are in fact and law no reasons to 
support the conclusion reached of no subject matter 
,_ 
jurisdiction, by the test of the above cited cases. 
The question \Yhether the 1natters all~ged in the 
petition constitute a collateral attack, or not, upon 
a judgment, is one \vhich the Cnurt itself decides 
in the exercise of its power and authority by law 
to try the class of cases to which the one in question 
belongs. In the exercise of that jurisdiction Courts 
may be called on to decide 'vhether, in a given case, · 
an objection made to a supposed judgment is a 
direct or a collateral attack, and whether in a given 
case, a direct or collateral attack, or both, is per-
missible. 
Such questions may arise in almost every class of 
cases. And when encountered Courts decide then1. 
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They do not adjourn or throw a case out of the win. 
dow, because such a procedural matter a.s that is 
encountered. Nor do they do so because, forsoothEJ. 
a pleading does not contain the kind of a praytr 
that the opponent thinks is appropriate. 1'he ob-
jection that the attack was collateral was made in 
many of the cases cited herein, but the Courts en-
countered no difficulty in ruling on the objections, 
nor did tl!ey im~gine that their right to do so wa~ 
in doubt. The objection that an attack is collateraj 
does not touch jurisdiction or the right to decide 
the question. 
We are not called upon, by the demurrer, to enter 
into an extended discussion of 'vhen an attack is 
direct and when collateral. The facts are stip-
ulated, and the legal conclusion therefrom is for 
the Court. In general it n1ay be said that whenever 
lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the rec-
ord of a judgment, it may be objected to upon either 
direct or collateral attack whenever produced. \\Then 
the lack of jurisdiction does not appear on the face 
of the record there is a difference, depending on 
the nature of the case. This grows out of the fact 
that not all objections to judgments rest upon juris-
dictional grounds. Judgments may he cancelled, 
stayed, or their enforcement enjojned in equity for 
many reasons, not touching jurisdiction. 'Vhere 
jurisdiction is not in question, the complaint must 
allege the sperifir ~rrounds.,. re-lied on for cancella-
tion, staying or enjoining the judgn1ent, and the 
attack must be direct. This is because of the pre-
sumptions in favor of the proceedings of courts of 
general jurisdiction, tha.t they correctly and ·proper-
ly perform their legal functions. But where the 
jurisdiction is la.cking, their right to function ceases 
and no judgn1ent on the merits can be entered, -
only dismissal. And the object'ion mav he made at 
•,J .... 
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any time, by any person, in any eourt, in any man-
ner, direct or collateral. The party is not then fight-
ing a judgment but a nullity. Of this class is all 
divorce actions in \Yhich the statutory residence of 
the plaintiff is lacking, or the facts as to defend-
ant's residence are mis-stated, as 've shall see a few 
pages later on. 
''\\lien any court is called upon to receive 
in evidence the record of a judgrnent, for-
eign or domestic, its forn1 and substance 
must ner.essarily be examined. Not, it is 
true, as a court of errors, but to see that it 
is what it purports to be, the record of a 
judgment. '' 
Lincoln v. To,ver, 2 McLean 473; Fed. Case 
No. 8,355. 
''It must be regarded as settled by previ-
ous decisions of this Court that where re-
covery is sought upon a judgment, the jur-
isdiction of the court rendering the judg-
ment is open to inquiry ( 
Old Wayne !f. L. Assn. v. McDonald, 27 
Sup. Ct. ~36; 204 U.S. 8, 
"It is "~ell settled that the jurisdiction of 
any court may he inquired into in every 
other court where the proceedings in the 
forn1er are relied upon and brought before 
the lattrr eourt by a party claiming the ben-
efit of such proceeding.'' 
V\Tilliamson v. Berry 8 Ho,v. (U.S.) 495, 540 
"If it once be conceded that the validity of 
a judg1nent 1nay be attacked collaterally by 
evidence sho,ving that the court had no jur--
isdiction, it is not perceived how any alle-
gation contained in the record itself, how-
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ever strongly made, can affect the right to 
so question it. The very object of the evi-
dence is to invalidate the paper as a record. 
If that can be done, no statements therein 
ca~ have any force. A slight form of 
words could always be adopted so as to 
effectually nullify the right of inquiry. 
Recitals of this kind must be regarded like 
asseverations of good faith in a deed, which 
can avail nothing if the instrument is shown 
to be fraudulent.'' 
Old Wayne M. L. Assn. v. McDonald, 27 
Sup. Ct. 236 ; 204 U. S . 8 . 
Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. (U.S.) 457 
21 L.Ed. 897, 901. 
~,erguson "Y'· Crawford, 70 N.Y. 253, 264; 
Syllabus 4. 
This exact question '\va.s raised in 
Clawson v. Acme Mines Dev. Co. 72 lJtah 
137; 269 Pac. 147, 
in which the District Court speaking by Judge 
Marks of Tooele ruled that "it would be an unwar-
rantable assumpticn of authority'' for that court 
to look and see if another court had jurisdiction to 
render the ·judgment offered in evjdente. His de-
cision 'vas reversed by' this Court on appeal. · 
The divorce judgment in Waters v. W~ters, No. 
60289 was void for lack of jurisdiction, and its in-
validity may be 'ShO'Vll by appellant whenever ann 
wherever she is confronted with 1t. Sh~ brought it 
to the court's attention as th.~ void thing that it i~, 
on. which her adversary seeks to take away her 
property rights in the estate of her husband .. Juris-
diction both of subject matter and parties was lack· 
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ing and it is ~ot a judg1nent. The same identical 
objection has arisen and been decided in every con .. 
ceivable manner as the following citations show. 
In the following cases the objection "\vas made in 
the divorce action itself at the trial or by later mo-
tion to set the judgment aside, and by appeal from 
the trial court's ruling. 
Calef v. Calef, 54 1\Ie. 365. 
' :1 ;, .~~ 
Jenness Y. Jenness, 24 Ind. 355. q: 
Cross v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 628. 
George v. George, 228 S. W. 408 (Ky.) 
Turner v. Turner, 88 Atl. 3 (\?"t.) 
Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 310. 
Powell v. Powell, 53 Ind. 513-5. 
Rumping v. Rumping, 91 P·ac. 1057 (Mont.) 
In the following cases the divorce defendants 
brought an independent action ir.. equity to vacate 
and set aside the divorce judgment on like juris-
dictional grounds against the plaintiff in divorce 
for lack of his statutory residence in the State be-
fore suing for the divorce. In these cases, both 
plaintiff and defendant in divorce were still alive, 
'vhich distinguishes those cases from the case at 
bar in 'vhich it is urged that this petitioner, Lena 
\raters, should have pursued the san1e reineq.y, by 
uction in equity, but against "\vhom is not stated. 
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 43 Utah 253; 134 
Pac. 595. 
Holmes v. Holmes, 63 Me. 420. 
Edson v. Edson, 108 11ass. 590~ 
Se,vall v. Sewall, 122 Mass 156, 161. 
Crouch v. Crouch, 30 Wis. 667. ~· 
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Everett v. Everett, 60 \Vis. 200. 
Potts v. P·otts, 45 AtL (N. J·. l1Jq.) 701. 
Rush v. Rush, 48 Iowa 701. 
; ~ 
The following cases were prosecutions for crime, 
such as bigamy, or other sexual crirnes in "\\'"hich 
the defendant's status as a p.reviously n1arried man 
wa.s an element in the case, and defendant relied 
upon a previous divorce. His offer of the divorce 
decree was rejecte-d on proof of his lack of stat-
utory residence defeating the court's jurisdiction 
to render it. 
People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247. 
Van Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 371. 
Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 2'63. 
The following cases were proceedings in probate to 
administer a decedent's estate in which a decree 
divorcing his then wife was offered by one of the 
contending claimants against the other. In the 
Field case the question wa.s, like the case at bar, be .. 
tween two women each claiming the ·widow's awa.rd 
or interest in the estate. 
I 
Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496; 74 N. E. 443. 
0 'Dell v. Goff, 117 N. W., 59, 61. 
Neff v. Beauchamp, 74 Iowa 92. 
In the follovving diversified cases the judgment in 
a former divorce action affecting the n1arriage 
status of one of the parties was relied on by one of 
the parties, objected to and excluded for the samE\ 
reasons, viz: lack of statutory residence require-
ment to show jurisdiytion, and false swearing of 
the plaintiff as to .his own or his wife's residence, 
or both. 
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l~eed v. Reed, 52 ~lich. 117, action by wife 
to compel her husband to sup·port her. 
Gregory v. Greg·ory, 78 Me. 18·7, action by 
wife against husband for dower. 
Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20 and 
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30, actions 
by \Yife ag·ainst husband for divorce, 
defended by husband on ground of p·rior 
divorce from wife. 
Worthington v. District Court and Judge 
Thereof, 142 Pac. 230 (Nev.), man-
damus to comp.el court to grant an 
order . for publication of summons 
against absent defendant, defended on . 
ground that plaintiff's residence was 
lacking or insufficient under ~tatute. 
Cavanaugh v. Smith, 84 Ind. 380, action by 
wife agai11.st husband for alimony al-
lowed by former divorce decree, de-
fended. by husband on same ground of 
insufficient residence of 'vife in divorce 
actinn. 
CheelPy v. Claytoi-J., 110 U. S. 701, 28 L." Ed. 
298~ action in U. S. Court to recover 
'vido,v's ~hare in deceased husband's 
estate, defended hy another woman 
~l~i.rning fl1so as 'vidow by later mar-
riage preceded by divorce of decedent 
from first wife. 
Parrish v. Parrish, 32 Ga. 653~ proceeding 
to probate a ·will 'vhere wife's rigJ1t to 
object depended on validity of forn1er 
divorce decree ohtnined against her by 
deceased husband. 
fn Rtrict analogy are the following cases on some-
\vhat variant facts, but in which the locus of the 
transaction controlled the jurisdiction of the court 
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to adjudicate the controversy consequent thereon, 
VIZ: 
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U. S.; 18 Wall. 
457; 21 L. Ed. 8971 
in which seizure of a ship for illegal dredging- of 
oysters and clams was by the statute to be adjudi-
cated in the township or precinct where the seizure 
occurred, not elsewhere. 
Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160; 21 L. Ed. 
271 and 
Knowles v. Gaslight Co., 86 U. S., 19 Wall. 
58 ; 22 L. Ed. 70, 
actions on former judgments, defeated by showing 
lack of service of summons, or insufficient service 
upon the defendant in the action. 
In the court below it was argued, and the court 
ap.parently decided that our statutory remedy under 
102-6-1 was naught, and that we should have sued in 
equity to set aside the divorce judgment. But 
again~t 'vhom, we inquire, should or could such an 
• 
action he brought by appellant~ Every action must, 
he brought by .a part~ aggrieved against the party 
comn1itting the grievance. And there must be a 
bone of contention, a controversy vvith that party, 
for decision by the court. . There mu~t be a res, 
a subject matter of the controversy. \Vhere would 
appellant have found these several factors on 
which to b\lild a suit in equity~ Would her suit be 
brought against Charles Wesley l.tVaters, now de-
C£la.sed ~ And what would be her quarrel with him, 
now that he is dead~ What would be her legal con-
troversy with him,- what her cause of action, and 
for 'vhat relief~ If he were still alive, she might 
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sue him to set aside the judgment (though void) 
which seemed to stand in the way of her right to 
continued support fron1 him~ She mig·ht, in con-
nection there,vith, sue him for a divorce and ali-
mony on her own account. Or she might ignore it 
and wait until he pleaded or produced it in evidence 
against her, and then have it rejected as void. She 
could select her remedies, and construct her plead-
ings to suit. But all these remedies depend on con-
tinued marriage relationship. When Mr. W a.ters 
died, no one else was bound in his place to support 
her, pay alimony, reside. with her, furnish marital 
rights and p.rivileges, or restore to her marriage 
status that \Yas dissolved by his death. S·o, who 
would appellant sue, and for what cause of action 
in equity? 
If a c~use of action coul~ be imagined, sh~ cannot 
sue and get service on a de,ad man. Hence the cas9 
is not ruled by the second group of cases men-
tioned supra (ante pp. '-l:tJ) where the wife sued 
her husband in equity while he was yet alive to have 
his divorce decree set aside and her marriage rights 
restored, enforced and p.rotected. 
A case illustrating these considerations was that 
of 
Dwyer v. Nolan, 82 Pac. 746; 40 ''Tash. 459. 
In that ca.se the plaintiff husband sued the ':vife for 
a divorce and obtained judgment on November 20, 
1899. On April 6, 1905 the wife filed a n1otion in 
the divorce action to set the decree aside, supported 
by affidavits, on the ground that the court had not 
obtained jurisdiction of her person, for lack of 
ndequate legal service of summons upo~ her. The 
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plaintiff husband having died before the wife 
appeared and filed her motion attacking the judg-
nient, she caused his executors to be substituted as 
parties plaintiff, to defend against her motion. The 
trial court entered judgment denying the motion, 
which was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court 
holding: 
''We will not enter intq _the question of 
'vhether or not the service in the divorce 
proceeding 'vas sufficient to give the court 
jurisdiction of the person of defendant, for 
the reason that there are no proper parties 
to this proceeding. In the nature of things, · 
the plaintiff having died, the question of 
divorce cannot ·be reli tiga ted. 
It will not be gainsaid that an action for 
divorce is a purely personal action. N oth-
ing is sought to be affected but the marital 
status of the husband and wife. The distri-
bution of property in such an action is in-
cidental, and it is clearly incontestable that 
upon the de:;1th of either party, whether be- ,_ 
fore or R_fter the decree, the subje·ct of the 
,controversy is eliminated. 
If the plaintiff's death had occurred be-
fore jud,~;"r:lent of divorce: his executors 
could not have been subRtituted ··to repre-
sent him in prosecuting the action to judg-
ment }Jo InorP can they he substituted for 
him after judgment. They cannot stip-
ulate with reference to the decree, nor con-
sent to its h~ing set aside. There is no con-
. ceiva ble particular in 'v-hich they repre-
sent the deceased or the heirs with ref-
erence to the subject matter of the divorce 
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the 1notion to vacate the judgment upon 
them \vas farcical.'' 
We forbear to quote further and refer the Court 
to the opinion for its further reasoning in point 
here. In closing, the opinion says : 
•' So iar as property rights are concerned, 
if there are any, if the (divorce) judgment 
is void, such rights are in no way affected by 
it., and all avenues are open for thP- de-
termination of such rights where the parties 
affected can be heard. '' 
82 Pac. 746, 747 . 
So say we here, and appellant resorts to her stat-
utory remedy under 102-6-1 where the p~arties 
affected can be heard. 
In actions in equity to set aside a judgment on other 
than jurisdictional grounds, or in motions unde-r 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-14-4 
for relief against judgments? it is required that de-
fendant tender an answer showing merits and a 
good defense, and ask to li tiga.te the rna tter if let 
in to dP,fend. But how could app·ellant here do that, 
when her opponent is dead and the subject 1natter 
or res no longer in existence - i.e.. the marriag~ 
status~ 
In hea.rings under Section 102-61, like our petition 
here, the court may be called upon, as in any other 
action, to pass :u:pon a judgment, deed, bond or othep 
written instrument in issue or in e-vidence, and de-
termine whether it is in fact what the party offer-
ing it claims it to be, that is, ~hether it is admis-
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sible in evidence. If genuine and within the issues 
' it is admitted, otherwise rejected. 
Let us assume now, to further test the demurrer, 
that appellant had or has an available remedy in 
equity against somebody or other to vacate and set 
aside the divorce decree, and be restored to he1 
marital rights and status with Mr. Waters, now dP. .. 
ceased. Then what~ It 'vould not follow that she 
was bo1md to em.ploy that remedy, or that she was 
excluded thereby from the statutory remedy pro-
vided by the legislature for that purpose. The case 
of 
In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17; 269 
Pac. 103, 
is in point on this. In that case as in the Weyant 
case (cited ante page 11), the p~ro bate proceedings 
were not attacked until after the estate 'vas closed. 
Then the State came in with its petition to reopen 
the estate proceeding-s in order to levy an inher-
itance tax. This was done and the tax claimed wa6 
allowed in part. On ap.peal it seerr1s to have been 
contenqed that the District Court in probate had no 
jurisdiction, and that resort should have be~n had 
to an independent suit in equity for the relief sought. 
On that p.oint our Supreme Court held: 
"T.~et it he· co;~c~ded that y,'"here, as here. an 
estate l1a~ l;ren fully closed and settled and 
the administrator discharged, an indepen-
dent action is maintainable. Yet, it does not 
necessarily follow, because of our statute 
relating to inheritance taxes, that such an 
action is the exclusive and only remedy. 
. . . 'V e_ in this State, have no indepen-
dent probate or surrogate court. Our dis .. 
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27 
trict courts are courts of general juris-
diction clothed with power to exercise, and 
do exercise under our probate code, all pro-
bate powers and judicial functions. Whether 
the district court sitting in p-robate has 
po,ver to hear and determine the contro-
versy here presented is dep·endent upon the 
statute. 
From a consideration of the whole statute 
relating to inheritance taxes, as well as the 
p.robate code, we think the subject matter 
wa.s within the jurisdiction of the court sit-
ting in p·robate} especially in view of Utah 
Comp. Laws, 1917, Sees. 3191, 3200, 3199, 
etc., ( <?Onferring the relief which the peti-
tion invoked). 
Thus, while an independent action might 
have been brought, still we think the peti- · 
tion could have been, as it was, filed in the 
cause in the matter of the estate of the de-
ceased, in the district court in probate." 
72 Utah 17; 269 Pac. 103. 
~To like effect see 
Weyant v. Utah Savings & rrrust Co., 54 
Utah 1.81; 182 Pac. 189, cited ante p. 11. 
In view that thjs Waters Estate case has not been 
closed, as hai the Thompson Estate case and the 
Weyant case, there is no reason at all why appel-
lant should forbear to purRne her statutory remedy 
under Section 102-6-1 in order to skirmish around 
in a separate action in equity. 
The foregoing disposes of all the grounds of de-
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several gtuunds of special deinurrer but they are 
fully answered by the petition and the amendatory 
p~aragraphs that were filed before the submission 
of the demurrer on the briefs, and were not dis-
cussed in the briefs. They are without merit, anJ 
in view of the dismissal on grounds heretofore dis-
cussed, require no attention here. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
court below should be reversed with directions to 
overrule the demurrer, and with costs to appellant. 
J. PAT TON NEELEY, 
PAUL C. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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